RE: Is Belief in God Logical? (Full Version)

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cognitivemagic -> RE: Is Belief in God Logical? (7/25/2008 4:54:08 AM)

About mathematics:

Kurt Godel has demonstrated that mathematics, as a "formal" system, has axioms/postulates that are not susceptible of "proof" within the system itself.

Yet, as these posts show, no one wants to say that mathematics is "illogical" or "irrational". But somehow the criterion of rational acceptability is not equitably given to theism. Why?

I think a better question to address is this:

Is belief in "logic" logical?

This question, which may seem pointless or trivial to some, actually points to a deep mystery in the knowing process; a mystery more perplexing than questions about the "rationality of belief in God". Why? Because the latter "mystery" of the "logic of belief in God" is dependent upon the more fundamental "mystery" of the former (i.e. the "logic" of logic). And also, because the question about the "logic" of logic faces the same conundrum as that of mathematics: that certain axioms/postulates are "unprovable".

But this entire approach is set within the epistemic and ontological framework of "coherentism".

So, what if we were to set about on the path of the "correspondence" theory of truth; namely, that propositional beliefs gain warrant or justification by virtue of their having some correspondence to some actual/factual states of affairs? Will this approach fair any better?

Contra the empiricist thesis (i.e. knowledge is derived solely by one or more of the 5 physical sense of the body), it doesn't seem to provide any correlation between highly abstract forms of mathematics (i.e. Discrete Math) and some observable condition of the material universe.

Also, how does a person begin to observe the material universe without already coming equipped with a cognitive apparatus by which he/she can make such observations? I found Locke and Hume's arguments unconvincing.

Suppose that we accept a Kantian approach: that there exists a formal structure of the mind by which empirical judgments are given meaning and context. In other words, while the mind has no "content" before empirical experience, yet the mind has a "form" by which empirical judgments can be had.

While I have entertained this notion, like a Stewart Hackett and a William Lane Craig, yet there is a crucial difficulty with this epistemic position (at least from the point of view of orthodox Kantianism); and that is, if the material universe did not furnish the "formal" structure of cognition, then what did? And why think that there is any rational correlation between the "formal" structure of thought and the empirical "content" of experience? And to believe or think that there is such a bridge between these two realities is itself a belief that is neither "formal" nor derived from "sensation". That would beg the entire question altogether!!

So we are left with a "pragmatic" justification of logic; namely, that logic is merely a conventional tool which we utilize for achieving some practical goal/end. This would be the approach of the anti-philosophical scientist/naturalist (embraced by those who accept "scientism", both methodologically and metaphysically).

The obvious problem with this approach is that questions of "usefulness" are irrelevant to questions about "truth". Even if something is "useful", questions about truth and falsity remain unaddressed. Lies, for instance, may be very useful; but the distinction between the "truth" and a "lie" is outside the category of pragmatics.

This is clear from the proposition itself: Lies may be very useful

The proposition is not a tautology. Lies are not identical with "useful". It's clear that the predicate is giving us more information than in contained in the subject. Surely, the statement "lies may be very useful" is unlike either of these propositions: "blue is blue", "all men and women are humans" and "all bachelors are unmarried males".

Plus, a "lie" would have to be identical with "truth", which would also have to be identical with "useful", in order to be a tautology. After all, why make a distinction between the "truth" and a "lie"? But then all statements/propositions would become meaningless, on this view.

Therefore, knowledge itself seems to lack the sort of "foundation" by which a claim of rationality can be made. So do we abandon logic altogether?

The answer would be "yes", if you accepted the sort of rigid parameters of rationality that atheists expect the theist to abide by. But, in that case, atheists are every bit as "irrational" as theists, as I hope my last several paragraphs have pointed out.

As I see it, I think the atheist is incapable of explaining how "consciousness" was jump-started from some primitive physical condition of the early earth. I refer those who are interested to read these:

Naturalism by Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro (in print)

C.S. Lewis' Dangerous Idea by Victor Reppert (in print)

The Emergent Self by William Hasker (in print)

The Mind and the Brain by Jeffery Schwartz and Sharon Begley (in print)

The Evolution of the Soul (Rev. Ed.) by Richard Swinburne (in print)

Reason to Believe by Richard Purtill (out-of-print)

Miracles: A Preliminary Study by C.S. Lewis (in print)

The Elusive Self by H.D. Lewis (out-of-print)

Body and Soul by J.P. Moreland and Scott Rae (in print)

The Self and It's Brain by John Eccles and Karl Popper (reprinted, although I'm not sure if it's still available)

The Mysterious Matter of Mind by Arthur Custance (out-of-print)


Hopefully, some will get a chance to get a hold of some of these excellent books that I've found very useful in my thinking about the nature of "consciousness".




theo_book -> RE: Is Belief in God Logical? (7/25/2008 8:28:14 AM)

quote:

(wayward1) I think you grossly overestimate the significance of axioms, postulates and assumptions.

These aren't big assumptions that require huge leaps of faith. They are merely starting points because they cannot be derived by principles of deduction. Without a place to start, there would be no math. You're calling these very simple and obvious assumptions a reason to doubt math? A thing being "unprovable" in this sense is like saying there's no way to prove 1 equals 1, so maybe it doesn't.

What are you claiming Geometry developed that is "untrue".


If "1 equals 1" was the only thing under consideration, I would agree with your assessment. But that is not the case.

"FAILURE" is what is taught by Geometry, and if you start with "Failure" as the major premise, you will most likely get "failure" for a conclusion. It is perpetuated failure based completely on the "unproved assumption" of mathematics, that certain exercises cannot be done.

There are three straight-edge/compass constructions Geometry says cannot be done.

The first is a simple construction of a square, equal in area to the area of a given circle. It is called "squaring a circle." To say "It can't be done" violates one of its basic Postulates; #2.

"Postulate;" A statement admitted without proof, to be true."
Postulate #2: "A straight line may be produced to any required length."

The failure is based upon a contradiction, based upon an historical impossibility. It goes as follows. Approximately 440 B.C. Hippocrates of Chios articulated two of the "impossible" "straight-edge and compass" problems of Geometric construction; i.,e., squaring the circle, and doubling the volume of a cube.

In approximately 420 B.C. Hippias articulated the third "impossible" "straight-edge and compass construction" problem of ancient Geometry; i.,e., that of trisecting "any" angle.(What works for one angle should work for "any" angle.)

But, Approximately 300 B.C. Euclid published his famous "The Elements" which is the basis for the world of Geometry until this day. In his "elements" he articulates the impossibility of the three "straight-edge and compass" constructions, because "they must be done in a Euclidean plane." And Modern Geometry backs that claim.

Excuse me! EXCUSE ME? How does Euclid claim so much authority that he can effect problems articulated prior to his birth? He CANNOT. YET, modern geometry accords him that authority.

Back to the problems.

The circle cannot be squared using straight-edge and compass only, because of the unsolvable construction of the value of pi. The area of a circle equals pi X r X r or Pi.r-squared. If the radius equals 1" and Pi r-square equals 3.1415926538979323846264- to infinity, the construction is impossible because the value of pi is unresolvable.

This of course is a direct denial of Postulate #2 "A straight line may be produced to any required length."

Either it can, OR it cannot. If it can, then the problem is solved by definition. If it cannot then the problem eliminates Postulate #2 as an error.

Postulates cannot be "truth" for some and "false" for other applications.

I have completed all three "impossible" constructs, with copyright, and am told by EXPERT Geometricians, "You have done the work, but it cannot be done, because it is not done in a Eucidean plane." The "Euclidean plane" was not known when the problems were articulated, therefore were not a limiting parameter. It become an ex post facto application of standards unknown when the problems were articulated.

But the real problem is this. The problem can be done within the parameters of their articulation. But the violation of Postulate #2 remains unaddressed.

And if "Postulates and Axioms are the ASSUMPTIONS UPON WHICH THE WHOLE SCIENCE OF MATHEMATICS RESTS," and ONE Axiom or ONE Postulate is shown to be wrong, how can we continue to trust any of the assumptions that may well just be "accepted without proof" and not "true" at all?

There is a saying in the scientific world, apart from Geometry; i.e., "It is true within a mathematical certainty." There is no such thing as a "mathematical certainty."

Every time a piece of property gets sold, it has to be surveyed. The reason is the original survey is not certain. And all surveys are mathematical applications of measurements; both linear and angular; sometimes topographical too. But "certainty?" Not at all.

The survey is dependent upon the calibration of the instruments used, the ability of the surveyer to read his instruments, and the movement of the earth's surface, as well as the temperature of the day.

And there is no "certainty" to be found in ANY system of application, even the "carbon dating" system as applied to the age of ancient artifacts. That is why it is constantly "upgraded" to different and "better" systems. If there is a 'Better" developed and applied, then we must of necessity, have been using a "worser" system. And THAT gets scary when you consider some of the claims made by "science" for their "mathematical certainties."




theo_book -> RE: Is Belief in God Logical? (7/25/2008 8:47:21 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: cognitivemagic

About mathematics:

Kurt Godel has demonstrated that mathematics, as a "formal" system, has axioms/postulates that are not susceptible of "proof" within the system itself.

Yet, as these posts show, no one wants to say that mathematics is "illogical" or "irrational". But somehow the criterion of rational acceptability is not equitably given to theism. Why?

I think a better question to address is this:

Is belief in "logic" logical?

This question, which may seem pointless or trivial to some, actually points to a deep mystery in the knowing process; a mystery more perplexing than questions about the "rationality of belief in God". Why? Because the latter "mystery" of the "logic of belief in God" is dependent upon the more fundamental "mystery" of the former (i.e. the "logic" of logic). And also, because the question about the "logic" of logic faces the same conundrum as that of mathematics: that certain axioms/postulates are "unprovable".


EXCELLENT presentation.

If one understands the "common use" definition of logic, one will wonder what you are talking aobut. But the "common use" definition ("If I understand something, it must be logical"), is not what "logic" is. Logic began, not as a mental comprehension tool, but as a debating discipline. It is mathematics, applied to a discipline, in the developement of how to properly address differences in a debate.

Major premise
Minor Premise
----------------
Therefore, (Conclusion)

The Major premise states the thing to be proved. The Minor Premise states some evidenciary support.
The conclusion is "Logically derived" by several methods all of which depend upon the properties of "logic" itself.

There is no "logical" proof for God." However, "logical" argument can be developed for demonstrating "God is."

It is a mathematical exercise, not a mental gymnastic. I appreciate very much, your post.




wayward1 -> RE: Is Belief in God Logical? (7/25/2008 5:38:27 PM)

sounds like you folks have given it a great deal more thought than I have. I'll have to give it some more thought. Am I reading this right that someone here has done their own work, copyrighted it, and had it rejected by the geometry "community"? That's quite sincerely fascinating. I'd love to know more about it.




theo_book -> RE: Is Belief in God Logical? (7/26/2008 8:53:45 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: wayward1

sounds like you folks have given it a great deal more thought than I have. I'll have to give it some more thought. Am I reading this right that someone here has done their own work, copyrighted it, and had it rejected by the geometry "community"? That's quite sincerely fascinating. I'd love to know more about it.


One of the problems (Squaring the circle; ) is in "Euclidian Plane" and the Second (Doubling the Volume of the cube) and third (Tri-secting the angle) are three dimensional.




cognitivemagic -> RE: Is Belief in God Logical? (7/26/2008 9:25:09 PM)

quote:

Skepticism, even of science, is generally healthy.


What about being skeptical of skepticism? Or shall we be dogmatically skeptical?

quote:

If one understands the "common use" definition of logic, one will wonder what you are talking aobut. But the "common use" definition ("If I understand something, it must be logical"), is not what "logic" is. Logic began, not as a mental comprehension tool, but as a debating discipline. It is mathematics, applied to a discipline, in the developement of how to properly address differences in a debate.

Major premise
Minor Premise
----------------
Therefore, (Conclusion)

The Major premise states the thing to be proved. The Minor Premise states some evidenciary support.
The conclusion is "Logically derived" by several methods all of which depend upon the properties of "logic" itself.

There is no "logical" proof for God." However, "logical" argument can be developed for demonstrating "God is."

It is a mathematical exercise, not a mental gymnastic. I appreciate very much, your post.


Aristotle was the first thinker to formalize a "system" of logic, so perhaps it would be appropriate to take him as the exemplar of the purpose of "formal" logic.

Let me quote Frederick Copleston in this regard:

"The Aristotelian Logic is often termed "formal" logic. Inasmuch as the Logic of Aristotle is an analysis of the forms of thought (hence the term Analytic), this is an apt characterization; but it would be a very great mistake to suppose that for Aristotle logic concerns the forms of human thinking in such an exclusive way that it has no connection with external reality. He is chiefly concerned with the forms of proof, and he assumes that the conclusion of a scientific proof gives certain knowledge concerning reality. For example, in the syllogism "All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal," it is not merely that the conclusion is deduced correctly according to the formal laws of logic: Aristotle assumes that the conclusion is verified in reality. He presupposes, therefore, a realist theory of knowledge and for him, logic, though an analysis of the forms of thought, is an analysis of the thought that thinks reality, that reproduces it conceptually within itself, and, in the true judgment, makes statements about reality which are verified in the external world."

(History of Philosophy, Vol. 1: Greece and Rome)

This analysis fits much better with Aristotle's epistemic approach, which, in fact, leans more towards empiricism; although it would be unfair to classify him as a "strict" empiricist. In other words, Aristotle is not interested (as David Hume was) in making a synthetic/analytic distinction. Furthermore, Aristotle was not caught up in the web of Occam's nominalism and Enlightenment anti-metaphysics.

But my point was much deeper than "there is no logical proof for God's existence".

My point was that, given a restricted notion of "proof" of a W.K. Clifford-type, something much more puzzling emerges: namely, that you cannot "prove" anything at all.

In fact, a British theologian named Richard Whatley (1787-1863) responded to David Hume's skepticism in much the same way in his "Historic Doubts Relative to Napolean Bonaparte". His point was this: given Hume's strict definition of miracles, and his even stricter criterion for believing that one had occurred, it would be fair to say that the existence of Napolean Bonaparte is extremely doubtful!!

I propose, therefore, to abandon the notion of "proofs" as a be-all and end-all for "rationality". As I said in my previous post: there is something deeply mysterious and incomprehensible about "consciousness" (i.e. the knowing process). This is especially true for thinker who believe that "natural laws" explain everything in the material universe. Of course, the scientists and naturalists "theories" are conveniently precluded from the category of natural causation, and instead, are placed in the categories of "enlightened", "rational", "logical", "factual", "evidential", etc.; categories that are not congruent with the idea of natural causation/physical determinism.

Theism, on the other hand, at least has a category that is analogous to that of human minds, and is able to give some plausible causal/source account of human consciousness: the Divine Mind.

Now, a skeptics point could be this: that we don't really know anything at all (i.e. agnosticism). But this claim undermines itself because it is making a claim to know something: that we don't know anything.

And this is clearly non-sensical and self-contradictory.

I believe that the issue of "rationality" (in general) has to be cleared up before sweeping assertions about the "rationality" or "irrationality" of religious belief can be pontificated upon by the atheist.

In other words, the atheist is going to have to give some sort of plausible account of "rationality" and "consciousness" before he/she can begin to deconstruct religious beliefs; because all such "deconstructions" will be rooted in groundless self-assertions.




wayward1 -> RE: Is Belief in God Logical? (7/26/2008 9:33:24 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: cognitivemagic

quote:

Skepticism, even of science, is generally healthy.


What about being skeptical of skepticism? Or shall we be dogmatically skeptical?


Given the inherent imperfections in our natural ability to perceive, I'd say a small degree of skepticism should go with us to the grave. That is far from dogmatic. A dogma is a point of view or tenet put forth as authoritative without adequate grounds.

If it is repeatedly observed that humans are imperfect observers then we would have adequate grounds to put forth a tenet of "skepticism", making permanent and unwaivering skepticism absolutely not dogmatic until humans demonstrate that they can perceive perfectly accurately.


quote:

Now, a skeptics point could be this: that we don't really know anything at all (i.e. agnosticism).


Agnostics claim we can't know, which is very different from claiming we "don't know anything at all". Perhaps you were thinking of nihilists.


quote:



I believe that the issue of "rationality" (in general) has to be cleared up before sweeping assertions about the "rationality" or "irrationality" of religious belief can be pontificated upon by the atheist.

In other words, the atheist is going to have to give some sort of plausible account of "rationality" and "consciousness" before he/she can begin to deconstruct religious beliefs; because all such "deconstructions" will be rooted in groundless self-assertions.


Everything we humans do revolves around determining whose opinions deserve more respect than others. We all do it every day without thinking about it. A friend who swears it's not going to rain on a dark and cloudy morning will be disregarded in favor of carrying an umbrella. The opinion that seat belt use is good has won out over the opinion that it is bad. Even if your reductionist line of reasoning were proven valuable, and I'm inclined to think perhaps it is valuable, it would simply mean that we have to make decisions based upon what we have "good reasons" to make decisions upon.

1. There is no "good reason" to believe that "space and matter began."

2. There is no evidence for anything that is "immaterial." There is vast amount of evidence for things that are material. Therefore, based simply on the evidence, a material cause for anything that IS will be a better explanation than an immaterial or "magic" cause.

3. There is no obvious connection between complexity and an intelligent cause.

The list could go on and on and on.




cognitivemagic -> RE: Is Belief in God Logical? (7/26/2008 9:40:27 PM)

I'm glad you see my humor.

Don't forget to take into account my edited/revised post.

I had to tap into my inner OCD child to come up with it.

;-)




wayward1 -> RE: Is Belief in God Logical? (7/26/2008 10:14:24 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: cognitivemagic

I'm glad you see my humor.

Don't forget to take into account my edited/revised post.

I had to tap into my inner OCD child to come up with it.

;-)



I was hoping you wouldn't be offended by that comment. I think we all perform some cognitive magic to see things the way we want to some times. I'm not immune by any stretch of the imagination.




theo_book -> RE: Is Belief in God Logical? (7/27/2008 10:02:25 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: cognitivemagic

quote:

Skepticism, even of science, is generally healthy.


What about being skeptical of skepticism? Or shall we be dogmatically skeptical?

quote:

If one understands the "common use" definition of logic, one will wonder what you are talking aobut. But the "common use" definition ("If I understand something, it must be logical"), is not what "logic" is. Logic began, not as a mental comprehension tool, but as a debating discipline. It is mathematics, applied to a discipline, in the developement of how to properly address differences in a debate.

Major premise
Minor Premise
----------------
Therefore, (Conclusion)

The Major premise states the thing to be proved. The Minor Premise states some evidenciary support.
The conclusion is "Logically derived" by several methods all of which depend upon the properties of "logic" itself.

There is no "logical" proof for God." However, "logical" argument can be developed for demonstrating "God is."

It is a mathematical exercise, not a mental gymnastic. I appreciate very much, your post.


Aristotle was the first thinker to formalize a "system" of logic, so perhaps it would be appropriate to take him as the exemplar of the purpose of "formal" logic.

Let me quote Frederick Copleston in this regard:

"The Aristotelian Logic is often termed "formal" logic. Inasmuch as the Logic of Aristotle is an analysis of the forms of thought (hence the term Analytic), this is an apt characterization; but it would be a very great mistake to suppose that for Aristotle logic concerns the forms of human thinking in such an exclusive way that it has no connection with external reality. He is chiefly concerned with the forms of proof, and he assumes that the conclusion of a scientific proof gives certain knowledge concerning reality. For example, in the syllogism "All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal," it is not merely that the conclusion is deduced correctly according to the formal laws of logic: Aristotle assumes that the conclusion is verified in reality. He presupposes, therefore, a realist theory of knowledge and for him, logic, though an analysis of the forms of thought, is an analysis of the thought that thinks reality, that reproduces it conceptually within itself, and, in the true judgment, makes statements about reality which are verified in the external world."

(History of Philosophy, Vol. 1: Greece and Rome)

This analysis fits much better with Aristotle's epistemic approach, which, in fact, leans more towards empiricism; although it would be unfair to classify him as a "strict" empiricist. In other words, Aristotle is not interested (as David Hume was) in making a synthetic/analytic distinction. Furthermore, Aristotle was not caught up in the web of Occam's nominalism and Enlightenment anti-metaphysics.

But my point was much deeper than "there is no logical proof for God's existence".

My point was that, given a restricted notion of "proof" of a W.K. Clifford-type, something much more puzzling emerges: namely, that you cannot "prove" anything at all.

In fact, a British theologian named Richard Whatley (1787-1863) responded to David Hume's skepticism in much the same way in his "Historic Doubts Relative to Napolean Bonaparte". His point was this: given Hume's strict definition of miracles, and his even stricter criterion for believing that one had occurred, it would be fair to say that the existence of Napolean Bonaparte is extremely doubtful!!

I propose, therefore, to abandon the notion of "proofs" as a be-all and end-all for "rationality". As I said in my previous post: there is something deeply mysterious and incomprehensible about "consciousness" (i.e. the knowing process). This is especially true for thinker who believe that "natural laws" explain everything in the material universe. Of course, the scientists and naturalists "theories" are conveniently precluded from the category of natural causation, and instead, are placed in the categories of "enlightened", "rational", "logical", "factual", "evidential", etc.; categories that are not congruent with the idea of natural causation/physical determinism.

Theism, on the other hand, at least has a category that is analogous to that of human minds, and is able to give some plausible causal/source account of human consciousness: the Divine Mind.

Now, a skeptics point could be this: that we don't really know anything at all (i.e. agnosticism). But this claim undermines itself because it is making a claim to know something: that we don't know anything.

And this is clearly non-sensical and self-contradictory.

I believe that the issue of "rationality" (in general) has to be cleared up before sweeping assertions about the "rationality" or "irrationality" of religious belief can be pontificated upon by the atheist.

In other words, the atheist is going to have to give some sort of plausible account of "rationality" and "consciousness" before he/she can begin to deconstruct religious beliefs; because all such "deconstructions" will be rooted in groundless self-assertions.


I appreciate your post very much. I had not even considered the Aristotilean origins of the "logic" argument, because I had at one time been so wrapped up in the Mathematical development of "logic."

It serves as a reawakening. Thank you.

As for your examples.

If one could examine in a mirror, all that is to be seen, one could possibly define "God" from the description. But too much is "hidden" within this "image of God" to be very objective.

I like very much your "agnostic" presentaton "We know nothing at all" is an assertion that we know something; i.,e., nothing at all. VERY GOOD!




theo_book -> RE: Is Belief in God Logical? (7/27/2008 10:07:00 AM)

[QUOTE](WAYWARD1) Even if your reductionist line of reasoning were proven valuable, and I'm inclined to think perhaps it is valuable, it would simply mean that we have to make decisions based upon what we have "good reasons" to make decisions upon.

1. There is no "good reason" to believe that "space and matter began."

2. There is no evidence for anything that is "immaterial." There is vast amount of evidence for things that are material. Therefore, based simply on the evidence, a material cause for anything that IS will be a better explanation than an immaterial or "magic" cause.

3. There is no obvious connection between complexity and an intelligent cause.

The list could go on and on and on.
[/quote]

I assume, therefore I am. Sounds reasonable to me, therefore, I am more than I was.

I always did like progress.




cognitivemagic -> RE: Is Belief in God Logical? (7/30/2008 5:03:40 AM)

quote:

Given the inherent imperfections in our natural ability to perceive, I'd say a small degree of skepticism should go with us to the grave. That is far from dogmatic. A dogma is a point of view or tenet put forth as authoritative without adequate grounds.


But that's just my point: what "grounds" could a person have for skepticism?

Answer: none

And the reason for this is very obvious: skepticism is the principle by which all other beliefs must be filtered through. If you accept that a principle, other than skepticism, grounds "skepticism" itself, then how could you be said to be "skeptical" at all?

In other words, if you aren't skeptical with the beliefs that go towards "justifying" skepticism (and how could you be?), then you aren't a skeptic at all!! At the very least, you have no sustainable "groundless belief" objection to "faith".

That's what my initial rhetorical question, in this regard, was drawing attention to:

quote:

What about being skeptical of skepticism? Or shall we be dogmatically skeptical?


But observe what you said here:

quote:

Everything we humans do revolves around determining whose opinions deserve more respect than others. We all do it every day without thinking about it. A friend who swears it's not going to rain on a dark and cloudy morning will be disregarded in favor of carrying an umbrella. The opinion that seat belt use is good has won out over the opinion that it is bad. Even if your reductionist line of reasoning were proven valuable, and I'm inclined to think perhaps it is valuable, it would simply mean that we have to make decisions based upon what we have "good reasons" to make decisions upon.


Do you believe that the statement, "everything we humans do revolves around determining whose opinions deserve more respect than others", is just an opinion itself? Or did you state this as a "matter of fact"?

It looks to me like a self-contradiction, much like this: "I did not type this sentence in English" or "Everything I write is a lie".

Of course, self-contradictory statements are untrue because they are non-sense.

quote:

2. There is no evidence for anything that is "immaterial." There is vast amount of evidence for things that are material. Therefore, based simply on the evidence, a material cause for anything that IS will be a better explanation than an immaterial or "magic" cause.


Sure there is: skepticism

But you can't see it. You can't smell it. You can't hear it. You can't taste it. You can't feel it. Right?

Or is "skepticism" an object you can pour in a test tube and make observations about? Is skepticism light or heavy? Is it hot or cold to the touch? Can it escape earths gravitational force? Does it sound pleasant or shrill? Is it soft or hard? Does it taste sweet or bitter?

Answer: it's not even remotely quantifiable.

Yet, you still accept it. Why is that?

And if everything we humans do, rationally speaking, is imprisoned in a matrix of mere "opinion", then what possible point could you be making about "evidence" for the non-material? Wouldn't my argument be merely an "opinion"; an opinion that is attempting to gain the most respect? Wouldn't yours be, also?

On the one hand, you insulate yourself from criticism with the "opinion" argument. Then you go on the attack with the "evidential" argument. But you can't have it both ways.

Either everything you espouse is just an opinion; and therefore without "evidence".

or

You eschew the universality of mere opinion, in favor of some objective knowledge; knowledge grounded in some type of "evidence".

Which is it?

When I say, for instance, that the Christian God exists, I mean to say something that's true, independent of my own thoughts and feelings; much in the same way as when I say "earth exists". I'm certainly not trying to let my inner emoticon come out, just to get fresh air. I mean to make a claim that holds substance; even if, ultimately, I'm not very successful at it.

Although I disagree with many of her parenthetical points about "religion", Susan Jacoby's "The Age of American Unreason" (Pantheon 2008) has some substantial insights about post-modern intellectual erosion in America and the impact it has had on these very types of discussions. Also, Allan Bloom's "The Closing of the American Mind"....too good for words.




wayward1 -> RE: Is Belief in God Logical? (7/30/2008 10:59:58 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: cognitivemagic

But that's just my point: what "grounds" could a person have for skepticism?

Answer: none

And the reason for this is very obvious: skepticism is the principle by which all other beliefs must be filtered through. If you accept that a principle, other than skepticism, grounds "skepticism" itself, then how could you be said to be "skeptical" at all?


So you're suggesting that we can't compare ideas to reality and determine which ideas are good and which ideas are bad because no matter what we will always have the potential for flawed perception or a flawed basis for our initial doubt?

I hope you never get a doctor who ignores our ability to "compare ideas to reality" to determine whether to give you cyanide or morphine for pain. Our observed reality is that cyanide will kill you and morphine will make you feel less pain. Shall we select this opinion as a good one or a bad one? There was undoubtedly some level of skepticism that went into determining which ancient elixirs were having their intended effect and which ones were not. I'd say that is some skepticism we can all be thankful for. If someone is ever skeptical of a current treatment method they will have to provide justification for the skepticism because this opinion has been grounded in repeated observation and positive results.

quote:

In other words, if you aren't skeptical with the beliefs that go towards "justifying" skepticism (and how could you be?), then you aren't a skeptic at all!! At the very least, you have no sustainable "groundless belief" objection to "faith".

That's what my initial rhetorical question, in this regard, was drawing attention to:

Do you believe that the statement, "everything we humans do revolves around determining whose opinions deserve more respect than others", is just an opinion itself? Or did you state this as a "matter of fact"?



Well, I'm afraid that's simply silly.

It was a matter of opinion and now you are in the process of determining if my opinion deserves more respect or less respect than yours, therefore you are the embodiment of my "opinion" on this matter and a direct representation of why my opinion on this matter is correct, that we all make value judgments of each other's opinions constantly.

quote:

It looks to me like a self-contradiction, much like this: "I did not type this sentence in English" or "Everything I write is a lie".

Of course, self-contradictory statements are untrue because they are non-sense.


You have offered no grounds for considering anything I've written to be contradictory. You think you've found a slick little way to twist skepticism back on the skeptic and it is a useless and shortsighted endeavor. Skepticism being an abstract concept does not make all abstract concepts equally believable or unbelievable. No one is insisting that skepticism created the heavens and the earth.

quote:

Sure there is: skepticism

But you can't see it. You can't smell it. You can't hear it. You can't taste it. You can't feel it. Right?

Or is "skepticism" an object you can pour in a test tube and make observations about? Is skepticism light or heavy? Is it hot or cold to the touch? Can it escape earths gravitational force? Does it sound pleasant or shrill? Is it soft or hard? Does it taste sweet or bitter?

Answer: it's not even remotely quantifiable.

Yet, you still accept it. Why is that?

And if everything we humans do, rationally speaking, is imprisoned in a matrix of mere "opinion", then what possible point could you be making about "evidence" for the non-material? Wouldn't my argument be merely an "opinion"; an opinion that is attempting to gain the most respect? Wouldn't yours be, also?


Lol, yes your argument would be merely an "opinion" and so would mine. I'd be making an effort to have my opinion valued more highly than others.

quote:

On the one hand, you insulate yourself from criticism with the "opinion" argument. Then you go on the attack with the "evidential" argument. But you can't have it both ways.

Either everything you espouse is just an opinion; and therefore without "evidence".

or

You eschew the universality of mere opinion, in favor of some objective knowledge; knowledge grounded in some type of "evidence".

Which is it?


Where do you come up with this stuff? I can have it both ways. We can offer evidence to substantiate our opinions. I can require evidence of someone else to substantiate their opinion before I take it as "better than all the other opinions". I will offer evidence to substantiate my opinion just as soon as I start making claims that go against everything everyone has ever observed. Until I make that kind of claim, a supernatural thing that can be claimed without evidence can be rejected without evidence as well.

quote:

When I say, for instance, that the Christian God exists, I mean to say something that's true


I'm sure that is what you "mean" to do. You fail though. What you say is something that you believe or have faith in.

quote:

independent of my own thoughts and feelings; much in the same way as when I say "earth exists". I'm certainly not trying to let my inner emoticon come out, just to get fresh air. I mean to make a claim that holds substance; even if, ultimately, I'm not very successful at it.


You know, I absolutely love this whole thing you've just done here. In one breath you compare God to the Earth and say you mean to make a claim that has substance like "earth exists" but before that you compared God to an idea, and you placed Him on equal footing with skepticism. You are asserting that because skepticism is not a physical thing, I can't believe in that but then question someone's belief in God. But like I said, no one is making fantastic claims about the capabilities and importance of the Almighty lord skepticism. By comparing them you are openly admitting that God, too, is just an idea. Your feeling on the matter is that we can't argue against each other's opinions without embracing our own "questionable" opinions.

That's an interesting stance on the matter, but you don't really use it. No one can. You use my stance or you would be a social outcast. You make value judgments on other people's opinions on a regular basis. You are deeply engrossed in the business of "determining whose opinions are more valuable than others" right now, and you'll be doing it for the rest of the day and for the rest of your life. We do it about sports, movies, cars, religions, doctor visits (second opinions). It's just how we operate and you know it but you don't want to drop this silly "skepticism isn't real" thing because you thought you were on to something when it first occurred to you.


Sorry, but it is just more cognitive magic, but not real magic, they kind where you make something appear to be there that isn't there.

quote:

"The Closing of the American Mind"....too good for words.


the irony is tremendous




Jhud -> RE: Is Belief in God Logical? (7/30/2008 12:42:13 PM)

quote:

I'm sure that is what you "mean" to do. You fail though. What you say is something that you believe or have faith in.


What would having faith in something have to do with whether or not it is 'true'? To have faith in something doesn't diminish the capacity for it to be true.




wayward1 -> RE: Is Belief in God Logical? (7/30/2008 4:01:28 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Jhud

quote:

I'm sure that is what you "mean" to do. You fail though. What you say is something that you believe or have faith in.


What would having faith in something have to do with whether or not it is 'true'? To have faith in something doesn't diminish the capacity for it to be true.


I didn't mean to suggest that having faith in something diminished its capacity to be true, and I don't think I said any such thing. I said a believer might "mean to say something that's true" when he or she says "the Christian God exists", but all they can ever actually do is say they believe it.

It's worth noting that just like having faith in a thing doesn't make it less likely to be true, it also doesn't make it more likely to be true.




Jhud -> RE: Is Belief in God Logical? (7/30/2008 4:34:18 PM)

quote:

I didn't mean to suggest that having faith in something diminished its capacity to be true, and I don't think I said any such thing. I said a believer might "mean to say something that's true" when he or she says "the Christian God exists", but all they can ever actually do is say they believe it.

It's worth noting that just like having faith in a thing doesn't make it less likely to be true, it also doesn't make it more likely to be true.


Well, perhaps I wasn't clear here - a person can say both they believe something by faith, and that it is true.

One doesn't need to say that they can prove something is true in order to say it is true. For example, I think it is true that, "aspects of the universe can be accurately understood by applying the scientific method". Now that is a statement of faith, when which I believe to be true (as do many scientists) - it is not however provable.

Now you might rightly say that you do not believe anything to be true that is not empirically proven to your satisfaction, but that would be based on your belief that only those things which can be empirically proven can be said to be true, which is a personal standard (not to mention a somewhat contradictory one).




theo_book -> RE: Is Belief in God Logical? (7/30/2008 4:49:50 PM)

quote:

(wayward1) There is no evidence for anything that is "immaterial." There is vast amount of evidence for things that are material.


Does that mean the wind is "material?"




wayward1 -> RE: Is Belief in God Logical? (7/30/2008 5:25:15 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: theo_book

quote:

(wayward1) There is no evidence for anything that is "immaterial." There is vast amount of evidence for things that are material.


Does that mean the wind is "material?"



Theo, my friend, please take that back. There are molecules of particular gases that make up the air. Things like Oxygen, Nitrogen, Hydrogen, etc comprise what we call "air" on a day to day basis. It is air that is moving when the wind blows and yes it is a material thing, albeit at the molecular level. There are plenty of other molecular things that exist but cannot be seen without a little technological assistance. According to wikipedia hydrogen for example is the most abundant element in the universe, making up 75% of normal matter by mass and over 90% by number of atoms.




theo_book -> RE: Is Belief in God Logical? (7/30/2008 5:30:31 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: wayward1

quote:

ORIGINAL: theo_book

quote:

(wayward1) There is no evidence for anything that is "immaterial." There is vast amount of evidence for things that are material.


Does that mean the wind is "material?"



Theo, my friend, please take that back. There are molecules of particular gases that make up the air. Things like Oxygen, Nitrogen, Hydrogen, etc comprise what we call "air" on a day to day basis. It is air that is moving when the wind blows and yes it is a material thing, albeit at the molecular level. There are plenty of other molecular things that exist but cannot be seen without a little technological assistance. According to wikipedia hydrogen for example is the most abundant element in the universe, making up 75% of normal matter by mass and over 90% by number of atoms.


I knew that. Just wondered how you describe the parameters of "material." AAAAANNnnndddd!!! kinda wondered if you considered wind as evidence. [:)]




abraxas -> RE: Is Belief in God Logical? (7/31/2008 7:36:02 AM)

quote:

What about being skeptical of skepticism? Or shall we be dogmatically skeptical?


There are all sorts of claims about all sorts of things, from God to UFOs to ghosts. No one believes all of them. Often there are conflicting claims which cannot both be true, this is observable fact. So unless a person is willing to accept any and every claim, they would probably concede that skepticism is not only healthy but necessary.

Now skepticism of skepticism, I think that would be a healthy part of skepticism, but more so in some cases than others -- however the above fact gives a lot more weight to the principle of skepticism than there is for the principle of skepticism of skepticism. Take the psychic hotline, for example. Is it a good idea to be skeptical of that kind of claim? Is it equally important, or less so, to be skeptical of one's skepticism regarding the psychic hotline?

Another claim: the repair shop calls and tells me my vacuum cleaner is ready to pick up. Should I be skeptical of their claim? In this case I would say a "dogmatic skepticism" could use a healthy dose of skepticism.




theo_book -> RE: Is Belief in God Logical? (7/31/2008 7:53:58 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: abraxas

quote:

What about being skeptical of skepticism? Or shall we be dogmatically skeptical?


There are all sorts of claims about all sorts of things, from God to UFOs to ghosts. No one believes all of them. Often there are conflicting claims which cannot both be true, this is observable fact. So unless a person is willing to accept any and every claim, they would probably concede that skepticism is not only healthy but necessary.

Now skepticism of skepticism, I think that would be a healthy part of skepticism, but more so in some cases than others -- however the above fact gives a lot more weight to the principle of skepticism than there is for the principle of skepticism of skepticism. Take the psychic hotline, for example. Is it a good idea to be skeptical of that kind of claim? Is it equally important, or less so, to be skeptical of one's skepticism regarding the psychic hotline?

Another claim: the repair shop calls and tells me my vacuum cleaner is ready to pick up. Should I be skeptical of their claim? In this case I would say a "dogmatic skepticism" could use a healthy dose of skepticism.


Hmmm?? I'm Skeptical!




wayward1 -> RE: Is Belief in God Logical? (7/31/2008 11:03:17 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: theo_book

quote:

ORIGINAL: abraxas

quote:

What about being skeptical of skepticism? Or shall we be dogmatically skeptical?


There are all sorts of claims about all sorts of things, from God to UFOs to ghosts. No one believes all of them. Often there are conflicting claims which cannot both be true, this is observable fact. So unless a person is willing to accept any and every claim, they would probably concede that skepticism is not only healthy but necessary.

Now skepticism of skepticism, I think that would be a healthy part of skepticism, but more so in some cases than others -- however the above fact gives a lot more weight to the principle of skepticism than there is for the principle of skepticism of skepticism. Take the psychic hotline, for example. Is it a good idea to be skeptical of that kind of claim? Is it equally important, or less so, to be skeptical of one's skepticism regarding the psychic hotline?

Another claim: the repair shop calls and tells me my vacuum cleaner is ready to pick up. Should I be skeptical of their claim? In this case I would say a "dogmatic skepticism" could use a healthy dose of skepticism.


Hmmm?? I'm Skeptical!



Maybe I'm reading too much into that comment, theo, but something has to give here with the claims of how nothing can be proven and skepticism is only valid if you're skeptical of skepticism. I'm going to explain it in detail and unless you or cognitivemagic can reply with a reason I should change my mind, I'll expect to not see any more of this.

You are claiming that nothing can be proven and that evidence is nothing without testimony, and I want to concede right here and now that you are absolutely correct. Nothing can be proven.


First and foremost a proof is little more than a logically deduced argument, not an empirical one. That is, to be a "proof" arguments must demonstrate that their proposition is true in all cases to which they apply, without a single exception. An unproven proposition believed or strongly suspected to be true is known as a conjecture. And outside of mathematics and logic, everything is a conjecture.

Stephen Jay Gould wrote that, "The final proofs of logic and mathematics flow deductively from stated premises and achieve certainty only because they are not about the empirical world." He recognized, and it is an axiom of science, that there can be no such proofs in the empirical world. This is not because nothing is true, but because there is no mechanism for establishing any proposition as true "without a single exception." To empirically establish such a quality, we would have to actually observe every single instance of the event in question. How wonderful that would be were we able to do such a thing, but sadly... we cannot.

Therefore, in an empirical world where proof is forever unavailable to us, we must depend on other tools for establishing confidence in any conjecture. And we are fortunate to have such tools: evidence and reason. These tool allow us to reach conclusions with great confidence. But that confidence must always remain tentative and provisional.

Example: "The sun rises in the east."

We have great confidence in the statement as a provisional truth. We have observed innumerable such events, and the sun has never disappointed us so far. Each one of these observations is additional evidence that the sun rises in the east, and reason allows us to inductively gain great confidence that tomorrow it will do the same thing.

But the sun does not actually rise in the east at all. In fact, the sun's own motion has nothing to do with our experience of the sunrise. It is the earth's rotation towards what we call the "east" that creates the illusion of the rising sun. We now have better evidence and better reasoning that allows us to understand that the conjecture "the sun rises in the east" (considered "proved" by many for most of human history) is not actually true at all. And no matter how many times you wake me up, turn me to the east and point out that "the sun is rising in the east," you are still offering no proof. You are merely providing an additional piece of evidence for a conjecture that ultimately is not true at all.

History is filled with similar examples of things that were considered true (and mistakenly considered "proven") that ultimately turned out to be false.

But wait... that's not all.

Our current conjecture that the earth rotates towards the east is much better supported by both evidence and reason than the older conjecture that the sun rises in the east. Because of this we have great confidence that science is doing the best it can, which is progressively, painstakingly and incrementally approaching truth. Certainly in this example the step was a great one in that direction. But does that make our current understanding any more a "proof" than the older one?

The earth rotates towards the east, today. It was not always so. It will not always be so. Let's just use the old colloquial "the sun rises in the east" for ease of understanding, but only as an idiom for the rest of this discussion.

We expect the sun to "rise in the east" tomorrow, just as it always has. But there will come a day when that is not true. It is almost certainly absurd to imagine the transition will happen in a single night, and the probability of that is vanishingly small. Though it is not zero.

We can have great confidence that many of our conjectures are true. That confidence is necessarily so great that we lead our lives operationally understanding that they are true. It would be futile to live our lives otherwise, and by the way we all operate, it is apparent that we all get this, whether we've considered it or not. And there is no need for anyone to embrace the absurdity that we do not know a lot of things that actually are true, just because we cannot prove them. In fact few things could be more absurd than doing so.

But that does not change the fundamental reality that you and the cognitive magician are technically correct to state that everything we believe, no matter how well supported by evidence and reason, is still conjecture and never proved.

When you point out that there is no "proof" of anything you behave as though this gives you permission to literally believe anything you want about the world. In so doing you are mutilating our understanding that nothing can be proven. If the only tools we really have are evidence and reason, then the only way we can distinguish what is probably true from what is probably false is by the quantity and quality of those two tools. And all competing ideas can be discriminated only by their evidence and reason.

When someone says (for example) "science cannot prove the existence or non-existence of god," the only reasonable responses are first, "Duh," and second "so what?" The arguments offered on either side never depended on proof in the first place. They depended on evidence and reason. And if the evidence and reason favors one conjecture over the other, then proclaiming that "you can't prove it" is exposed as a rather decisive abandonment of the intellectual field, and I warned you about how you should expect to not be taken seriously.

Here, for once and for always allow me to concede that science cannot prove anything. But it can AND DOES do a fabulous job of discriminating between good ideas (those with reason and evidence in their favor) and bad ideas (those without). And in this way, science can demonstrate that certain specific sectarian beliefs do not deserve the intellectual allegiance of any thinking person.

Your assertions that evidence is nothing without testimony are a drastically unfortunate waste of time.




Jhud -> RE: Is Belief in God Logical? (7/31/2008 1:54:24 PM)

quote:

Here, for once and for always allow me to concede that science cannot prove anything. But it can AND DOES do a fabulous job of discriminating between good ideas (those with reason and evidence in their favor) and bad ideas (those without). And in this way, science can demonstrate that certain specific sectarian beliefs do not deserve the intellectual allegiance of any thinking person.


I would be a bit more specific than this – science does a great job of discriminating between good and bad explanations of readily observable phenomena in nature. There are many ideas for which science is fairly useless - ideas about morality, human political, social, personal, spiritual, and to a large degree, economic relationships. And of course art, pleasure, and beauty are beyond scientific exploration.

And I think as well, science has great difficulty dealing with unique natural events in the past. Science has great difficulty even establishing the underlying philosophies upon which it is based.

So I think a well-rounded thinking person would not limit his or her intellectual pursuits only to scientific forms of thinking – in fact, to do so would be to retard the fuller intellectual experience of a person.




wayward1 -> RE: Is Belief in God Logical? (7/31/2008 8:23:15 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Jhud



I would be a bit more specific than this – science does a great job of discriminating between good and bad explanations of readily observable phenomena in nature. There are many ideas for which science is fairly useless - ideas about morality, human political, social, personal, spiritual, and to a large degree, economic relationships. And of course art, pleasure, and beauty are beyond scientific exploration.


I would imagine you'd get some significant push back from economists, social scientists, political science undergrads and many others.

But to me, even if your assessment could be considered exactly correct, the perspective gained by scientific study of what it can study would lend itself to better behavior and healthier approaches to the areas it can't. It definitly has done so for me at least.

quote:

And I think as well, science has great difficulty dealing with unique natural events in the past. Science has great difficulty even establishing the underlying philosophies upon which it is based.


If science was based on an underlying philosophy then that would mean it had preconceived ideas. Science depends on no one establishing "underlying philosophies" beyond the obvious pursuit of understanding that goes without saying.

quote:

So I think a well-rounded thinking person would not limit his or her intellectual pursuits only to scientific forms of thinking – in fact, to do so would be to retard the fuller intellectual experience of a person.


I disagree.




theo_book -> RE: Is Belief in God Logical? (7/31/2008 8:55:11 PM)

quote:

(cognitivemagic)(post#231) What about being skeptical of skepticism? Or shall we be dogmatically skeptical?

(abraxas)(post #245)There are all sorts of claims about all sorts of things, from God to UFOs to ghosts. No one believes all of them. Often there are conflicting claims which cannot both be true, this is observable fact. So unless a person is willing to accept any and every claim, they would probably concede that skepticism is not only healthy but necessary.

Now skepticism of skepticism, I think that would be a healthy part of skepticism, but more so in some cases than others -- however the above fact gives a lot more weight to the principle of skepticism than there is for the principle of skepticism of skepticism. Take the psychic hotline, for example. Is it a good idea to be skeptical of that kind of claim? Is it equally important, or less so, to be skeptical of one's skepticism regarding the psychic hotline?

Another claim: the repair shop calls and tells me my vacuum cleaner is ready to pick up. Should I be skeptical of their claim? In this case I would say a "dogmatic skepticism" could use a healthy dose of skepticism.

(theo_book)(post#246) Hmmm?? I'm Skeptical!

(wayward1) (Post #247) Maybe I'm reading too much into that comment, theo, but something has to give here with the claims of how nothing can be proven and skepticism is only valid if you're skeptical of skepticism. I'm going to explain it in detail and unless you or cognitivemagic can reply with a reason I should change my mind, I'll expect to not see any more of this.


(theo) A "Skeptic," simply put, is one who asks questions. Through misuse however, it has come to mean or imply "one who doubts everything." That is not the case. And the phrase "skepticism of skeptism" has no meaning other than to say "I question your right to question." It is a phony rationalization, and you have been sucked in.

quote:

(wayward1) You are claiming that nothing can be proven and that evidence is nothing without testimony, and I want to concede right here and now that you are absolutely correct. Nothing can be proven.

First and foremost a proof is little more than a logically deduced argument, not an empirical one.


(theo) That is not the basis of my argument. Proof has not a lot to do with logic, nor with deduceing empirically. It has to do with agreement. It is that simple.

I examine a "thingy;" analyze it; consider it; agonize over it for "meaning" or "significance" or any number of responses. I reach a conclusion based upon my experience; my education; my biases; my level of comprehension; my command of language; my ability to imagine; my understanding of basic scientific principles.

YOU examine a "thingy;" analyze it; consider it; agonize over it for "meaning" or "significance" or any number of responses. YOU reach a conclusion based upon YOUR experience; YOUR education; YOUR biases; YOUR level of comprehension; YOUR command of language; YOUR ability to imagine; YOUR understanding of basic scientific principles.

THEY examine a "thingy;" analyze it; consider it; agonize over it for "meaning" or "significance" or any number of responses. THEY reach a conclusion based upon THEIR experience; THEIR education; THEIR biases; THEIR level of comprehension; THEIR command of language; THEIR ability to imagine; THEIR understanding of basic scientific principles.

Then we all get together and compare conclusions based on the results of our examination and analysis. If there is one of me, one of you, and sixty thousand of them, the result will be the same. All we need to do is develope a majority concensus of opinion as to the validity of a common conclusion. WHICHEVER conclusion has the most agreement is the winner, and is pronounced "TRUE." THAT is the basis of all truth among men.

quote:

(wayward1) That is, to be a "proof" arguments must demonstrate that their proposition is true in all cases to which they apply, without a single exception. An unproven proposition believed or strongly suspected to be true is known as a conjecture. And outside of mathematics and logic, everything is a conjecture.


(theo) Some disciplines of mathematics, perhaps, but not all. And most certainly logic should be consistant, but than again, most people consider logic to mean "If I understand it, it must be logical." Take that and divide it among sixty thousand and two, and what do you get? Still, a majority concensus.

quote:

(wayward1) Stephen Jay Gould wrote that, "The final proofs of logic and mathematics flow deductively from stated premises and achieve certainty only because they are not about the empirical world." He recognized, and it is an axiom of science, that there can be no such proofs in the empirical world. This is not because nothing is true, but because there is no mechanism for establishing any proposition as true "without a single exception." To empirically establish such a quality, we would have to actually observe every single instance of the event in question. How wonderful that would be were we able to do such a thing, but sadly... we cannot.


(theo) If I understand what you said, this would be why Evolution is a theory and not a fact; even though many on these boards teach and preach it as the "fact of evolution."

quote:

(wayward1) Therefore, in an empirical world where proof is forever unavailable to us, we must depend on other tools for establishing confidence in any conjecture. And we are fortunate to have such tools: evidence and reason. These tools allow us to reach conclusions with great confidence. But that confidence must always remain tentative and provisional.


(theo) Reason of course is subject to my experience; my education; my biases; my level of comprehension; my command of language; my ability to imagine; my understanding of basic scientific principles.

And much that is "evidence" is subject to our analysis and evaluation which is based upon my experience; my education; my biases; my level of comprehension; my command of language; my ability to imagine; my understanding of basic scientific principles.

quote:

(wayward1) Example: "The sun rises in the east."

We have great confidence in the statement as a provisional truth. We have observed innumerable such events, and the sun has never disappointed us so far. Each one of these observations is additional evidence that the sun rises in the east, and reason allows us to inductively gain great confidence that tomorrow it will do the same thing.

But the sun does not actually rise in the east at all. In fact, the sun's own motion has nothing to do with our experience of the sunrise. It is the earth's rotation towards what we call the "east" that creates the illusion of the rising sun. We now have better evidence and better reasoning that allows us to understand that the conjecture "the sun rises in the east" (considered "proved" by many for most of human history) is not actually true at all. And no matter how many times you wake me up, turn me to the east and point out that "the sun is rising in the east," you are still offering no proof. You are merely providing an additional piece of evidence for a conjecture that ultimately is not true at all.


(theo) I think that is understood to be "accomodative language."

quote:

(wayward1) History is filled with similar examples of things that were considered true (and mistakenly considered "proven") that ultimately turned out to be false.


(theo) "The earth is flat" is one such example. Of course it was the brainchild of Portugese traders who wanted to keep their trade routes secret from the English and Spanish. They started telling it in every port worldwide into which their ships were docked, and voila, "flat earth society."

quote:

(wayward1) But wait... that's not all.

Our current conjecture that the earth rotates towards the east is much better supported by both evidence and reason than the older conjecture that the sun rises in the east. Because of this we have great confidence that science is doing the best it can, which is progressively, painstakingly and incrementally approaching truth. Certainly in this example the step was a great one in that direction. But does that make our current understanding any more a "proof" than the older one?


quote:

(wayward1) The earth rotates towards the east, today. It was not always so. It will not always be so. Let's just use the old colloquial "the sun rises in the east" for ease of understanding, but only as an idiom for the rest of this discussion.

We expect the sun to "rise in the east" tomorrow, just as it always has. But there will come a day when that is not true. It is almost certainly absurd to imagine the transition will happen in a single night, and the probability of that is vanishingly small. Though it is not zero.

We can have great confidence that many of our conjectures are true. That confidence is necessarily so great that we lead our lives operationally understanding that they are true. It would be futile to live our lives otherwise, and by the way we all operate, it is apparent that we all get this, whether we've considered it or not. And there is no need for anyone to embrace the absurdity that we do not know a lot of things that actually are true, just because we cannot prove them. In fact few things could be more absurd than doing so.

But that does not change the fundamental reality that you and the cognitive magician are technically correct to state that everything we believe, no matter how well supported by evidence and reason, is still conjecture and never proved.

When you point out that there is no "proof" of anything you behave as though this gives you permission to literally believe anything you want about the world. In so doing you are mutilating our understanding that nothing can be proven. If the only tools we really have are evidence and reason, then the only way we can distinguish what is probably true from what is probably false is by the quantity and quality of those two tools. And all competing ideas can be discriminated only by their evidence and reason.

When someone says (for example) "science cannot prove the existence or non-existence of god," the only reasonable responses are first, "Duh," and second "so what?"


(theo) I think science CAN prove the existence of God, from evidence and reason. The fact that they don't is from choice and free will. It is the result of a decision. The creation, the flood, the crucifixion of Christ, is is claimed are all "accepted by faith by the Christian community."

That is a singular fallacy of reasoning with a total disregard for evidence. All of those events have sufficient evidence to sustain analysis and evaluation resulting in a majority concensus of "truth."

The ONLY thing Christians are to accept by faith, is the promise of God, that we also will be in the resurrection. And this "faith" is sustained by two things; the FACT of the resurrection of Christ, with eye-witness testimony sufficient to convince hundreds of thousands in the ancient world; and the promise of God, based upon the experiences of a people who walked accross a wilderness world for forty years, eating manna on a daily basis; witnessing, seeing, and tasting a miracle. And for forty years they did this. That does not have to be proved any more than the seven wonders of the ancient world have to be "seen and touched and felt" by each occuring generation before we can consider it as fact. It has already been proved by generations. It does not have to be proved again. The "Fact" may be accepted, or it may be rejected, but it does to have to be reproved.

quote:

(wayward1) The arguments offered on either side never depended on proof in the first place. They depended on evidence and reason. And if the evidence and reason favors one conjecture over the other, then proclaiming that "you can't prove it" is exposed as a rather decisive abandonment of the intellectual field, and I warned you about how you should expect to not be taken seriously.

Here, for once and for always allow me to concede that science cannot prove anything. But it can AND DOES do a fabulous job of discriminating between good ideas (those with reason and evidence in their favor) and bad ideas (those without). And in this way, science can demonstrate that certain specific sectarian beliefs do not deserve the intellectual allegiance of any thinking person.

Your assertions that evidence is nothing without testimony are a drastically unfortunate waste of time.


(theo) And your expenditure of testimony is a testimony to the fact of its importance in communicating the evidence in favour of that fact to us.)

Do you know why the "facts" of scripture are now in such disfavour in the scientific world?

In 1753 a French Physician named Astruc analyzed the book of Genesis by dividing its account according to whether God was identified as "Elohim" or "Jehovah." Astruc argued for the Mosaic authorship, though he denied the "source" material within its pages.

In 1787, and 1803, Eichhorn, who has been called "The Father of Higher Criticism," agreed with Astruc's analysis and finding that Moses was the author of the Pentateuch. Neither of them carried the analysis beyond the beginning chapters of Exodus.

In 1805, De Wette challenged the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, and assigned Deuteronomy to the time of Josiah. this stirred a calamitous controversy, causing many writers to come forward in defense of the traditional view.

By 1823, Eichhorn no longer insisted upon the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch.

In 1823, Bleek extended the analysis to Joshua, and confirmed the critics in their opinion that Moses did not write the Pentateuch, as they now considered it to extend beyond the lifetime of Moses, so how could he be its author? Which in turn, called into question much of the source material attributed to him. This is circular reasoning at its worst. "The Pentateuch couldn't have been written by Moses, because his sources have been determined, by our theory, to post date him, therefore could not have been his work;" so goes the argument of Higher Criticism.

The original theory, as proposed by Astruc and Eichhorn, was a "two-document" hypothesis, depending upon two documents as source material for the Mosaic documents. Publication of their "theory" opened the floodgates for many other "higher criticism" theories, which are in reality, nothing but an attack upon the accepted scriptures, as from God; with its built-in "authority," and all that implies.

It (the "two-document theory") was based upon a very silly fraud. They took apart the Massoretic text, and assigned every verse that calls God Jehovah to one scribe, while those verses calling God Eloheem, were assigned to another, because they considered the different name, to be a different "style." Then of course, they are inconsistant, because they did not follow their own silly logic, by further breaking it down into "El," "Eloah," "Adown," "Adonay," "El Shaddai," and etc., but did in fact break "Eloheem" down into two sources, calling them old Elohist, and young Elohist. They further came up with Jehovist, and Deuteronomist.

As for the question of "style;" Do you know how many Hebrew expressions may be translated "destroy," in one form or another? Or "destruction?" In Gen 18-19, four different Hebrew verbs are utilized in expressing this concept; one is used four times, another nine times, another three times, and one is used once. The entire reference, (except 19:29) is assigned to "J" as its author, because of "style." Yet two of these words appear in 19:29, which "Higher criticism" appropriates for "P" because of "style."

What is the significance of this? It simply shows that the "higher criticism" theorists are inconsistant, because they allow "J" to use a variety of words, which they use to allocate "style," in this instance; yet deny him the same variety, "because of style," with reference to other words.

Look for a parallel example in today's publication of some alleged "bible code" which purports to "break the code of scripture" and telling all the secrets of the ages. The suggestion that by removing all punctuation, and spaces, thus making one long word out of the bible; then starting at the beginning and spelling out words by the succession in which the letters appear, "discovers" God's real message, fails to address the issue of the fact that the scriptures were not written in English, nor a particular translation, but in Hebrew and Greek. It is another fraud, but there are many who believe they can "crack the code" because some fool published an untested theory.

They finally arranged the "documentary hypothesis" so that;
"J" references the Jehovist
"E" references the second Elohist
"D" references the Deuteronomist
"P" references the first Elohist.

The Testimony of "Tradition" contradicts the "theory" of Higher Criticism.
Higher Critics do not deny the antiquity and universal acceptance of the tradition that the Pentateuch is "of Moses." they rather affirm that their own untested view is in fact a "modern discovery." The Apocrapha; Josephus; Philo; the Talmud; Mileto, Bishop of Sardis (cir,175 a.d.); All the Church Fathers lists of canonical scriptures; The Common tradition to them all, is that it represents the teachings of the bible itself.

The universal understanding, among Jews and Christians, was that Moses wrote the Pentateuch. Josephus states this to be the case, for Judaism; and in Luther's translation of the bible, "a book of Moses" titles each of the books of the Pentateuch. The 1611 KJV echos the sentiment. A very important question relating thereunto, is, how true is the basis for this tradition which dates from antiquity?

1. The basis for the tradition that Moses wrote the Pentateuch is manifold.

a. The claims that the Pentateuch makes for itself.

The quotation from Josephus, that the Pentateuch "contains Moses' laws," is borne out by the document itself. It is clearly declared that the decalogue, given at Sinai, were made by Moses; and that the ten "words" were uttered in his presence [Exo 20:19ff]; He was told later to write them; [34:27].

With reference to the laws of Exod 21-23, we are specifically told that "Moses wrote all the words of Jehovah" [24:4]; and the document which contains them is clearly understood to be the "book of the covenant."[vs.7]

Tabarnacle construction and directions appertaining thereunto are given in Exo 25-31, in the form of personal communications to Moses; and the actual construction account is replete with references to "as Jehovah commanded Moses."

In the Leviticus account, the words "Jehovah spake (said, called0 unto Moses" (or less frequently, "unto Moses and Aaron"), occur 35 times, 19 of which are at chapter beginnings. Lev 26:46 and 27:34 connect the giving of these priestly laws, with specificity, to Sinai.

Numbers follows much the same pattern; nearly half the chapters beginning the same way; the last verse being in the encampment at Moab.

Deuteronomy rehashes what has already been said, with a view to preparing the people for the new circumstances under which these laws will prevail. Deu 31:9,24 says Moses wrote the law in a book; verse 26 tells us the Levites were commanded by Moses, to put this book inside the Ark of the covenant.

The Historicity of the events recorded, has the same broad application as that of the legal aspect. Moses was told to write of God's judgment upon Amelek, "in a book" [Ex 17:14]. It is also stated that Moses wrote wrote the journal of the travels, recorded in Numbers 33. We are told that Moses gave to Israel, the song and benediction recorded in Deu 32-33.

The fact of these chapters being attributed to Moses, reminds us of Josephus' reference, "and the traditions of the origin of mankind till his death." They show that Moses was interested in the history of his people [Deut. 32:7-8]; and the author of Deut 33 might well have recorded Gen 49. While it is true, the book of Genesis nowhere records moses as its author, however, the "and" with which Exodus begins, continues an intelligible sequel to the Genesis account as no other book does.

b. Testimony of the Old Testament
References to Moses are as numerous in Joshua as in all the other books of the Old Testament in total. They purport to show that Joshua derives his authority from Moses. Appeal is constantly made to "as Moses commanded." These references serve to define Joshua's role after the death of Moses; Joshua is often spoken of, as though he were Moses' successor. This is misleading. [Deu 18:15,18][Acts 3:20-24] Jesus Christ was Moses' successor.

Fourteen other books reference Moses by name. More frequently, they reference "the Law."

c. Testimony of the new Testament
Jesus did not dispute the Old Testament Canon as accepted by the Jews. His challenge was always to their misinterpretation of it, and failure to obey its mandates. [Lk 20:37; John 7:19]] This is made abundantly clear in Luke 24:27,44, showing that Jesus recognized the divisions of the Old Testament, as later defined by Josephus, already in existance; and that the "writings" of Moses [John 5:47; Luke 16:29,31] which he referenced, were the Pentateuch. He quoted the decalogue [Exo 20:12; Deu 5:16] with the words "Moses said," [Mark 7:10]; adding quotations from [Exod 21:17] and [Lev 20:9]

When the Pharisees contested with him about divorce, [Mat 19:3] he appealed first to [Gen 2:24], When the appeal referenced "Moses command" [Deu 24:1-4], he showed that Moses allowed divorce because of their hardness of heart.

When the question concerning a brother's duty to a deceased brother's widow was placed in ridicule by the Saducees, who wanted to make resurrection appear as a fable, Jesus appealed to the utterance at the burning bush; [Exo 3:6, which in [Mark 12:26] are referenced as "the book of Moses," and in [Mat
23:31 ascribed directly to "God."

Paul the apostle subscribed to the same view. [Acts 28:23][Rom 10:19][1 Cor 9:9][2 Cor 3:15] indicating clearly that the New Testament viewpoint was that "Moses" and "the law" are equivalent expressions.

2. Consequence of rejection of the claim that Moses wrote the Pentateuch, is to leave nothing beyond the "modern discovery," for reference.

a. The first such consequence is rejection of all positive external evidence, both Biblical, and extra-biblical, as to authorship of the Pentateuch. This is not done on the strength of authority of older and better evidence, as no such evidence has ever been produced, much less offered.

It is done only on the basis of "theory," the correctness of which, has never been proved, nor honestly examined. It is simply "stated," then treated as though much scholarship had gone into the "discovery" thereof. THAT IS NOT THE CASE.

b. The second consequence of rejection of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, is to admit that the fundamental account is erroneous.

c. The third consequence of rejection of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, is the adoption of a low view of the authority and credibility of the bible in any capacity whatever.

3. The Methodology employed by the higher critics is responsible for these radical consequences.

a. A variation in diction, style, point of view, subject matter, are all seized upon as evidence for differing authorship. Different authorships become contradictions. Contradictions become lies.

b. The uniqueness of Israel's communication with God is rejected, and becomes a uniqueness of Israel itself, and its speccial genius for religion.

c. Supernatural redemptive efforts become naturalistic evolutionary effort.
"Miracles" become tales of "exageration," or presented as "unscientific." Well, miralces are not "unscientific." They are "NON-scientific."

Attacks upon the "truth of scripture" are just one of a long list of consequences, by those who do not wish to study the problem for themselves, depending upon traditions going back thousands of years, into antiquity; but would rather depend upon traditions dating back to 1753; which "tradition" is based upon an untested, unproved theory.

Attack upon the veracity of many of the verses within context has begun, stating that Mark 16, verse 9 through the end of the chapter, are redactive, for example, is one of many destructive approaches taken by those who would do away with the doctrines of hell and Eternal Damnation.

Two footnotes, found in the NIV serve to illustrate the point quite well;
The first is found with reference to Mark 16:9-20. It states, in a parenthesis, (The most reliable early manuscripts and other ancient witnesses do not have Mark 16:9-20). The second is found at John 1:18. It states- Some manuscripts- "but the only (or only begotten) son."

The only thing wrong with these statements is, they are pure fabrications, with no truth whatsoever. The truth of the matter is, there are two manuscripts in which John 1:18 has "theos" instead of "huis." They are the Codex Sinaiticus, and Codex Vaticanus. Coincidentally, these two manuscripts are the only two which omit the Mark passages in question.

The ancient manuscripts fall into the following classifications: 114 codices on parchment, wherein the capitals and characters run together; twelve hundred cursives containing the gospels; five hundred manuscripts containing all other parts of the New Testament: 500 manuscripts and 2000 copies- all but two of which contain the Mark references, and "huis" instead of "theos" in John 1:18. Yet, the revisors almost always will footnote with "some manuscripts include" when in fact, two do not.

The fact that the end of John (21:25) is missing from these same manuscripts; as also some text from the Hebrews manuscript (which ends at 9:14); John 7:53 through John 8:11; as well as others of the New Testament. yet, Mark 16:9-20 is the only one which is "authenticated" as "the most reliable and other early ancient manuscripts" being the cause of their ommission.

The Sinaitic leaves were discovered by Tischendorf in a wastebasket of a monastery at Mt. Sinai. This is not a very professional method of storing "ancient authentic manuscripts."

A Major breakdown of all that is held dear because of appeal to the older traditions, as the "modern studies" make their "new" and atrocious claims.

Sin is no longer sin. Hell disappears from doctrine, and eternal damnation becomes temporary punishment. All appeals to scripture fall on deaf ears, of those who fail to understand the value of history, to doctrine.

In the nineteenth century, three major editions of "Greek" have been produced; 1869-1872 by Tischendorf; 1881 by Westcott and Hort; 1894-1900 by Bernhard Weiss. Where two of these editions agree, it is presented by Nestle, as the most authentic Greek text available today.

In the twentieth century, (1958) a revised edition of Eberhard Nestle's text was provided by G.D.Kilpatrick, Erwin Nestle, and several other scholars in London England.

One major example of the result, is John 1:18: "monogonees theos ho hon..." as compared with "monogonees huis ho hon..." of the earlier, 1550 Greek text of Stephens, compared with Elzivor - 1624, Griesbach, Lachmann, Tichendorf, Tregellas, Alford, and Wordsworth. All of the earlier Greek texts read "huis" instead of "theos" with two exceptions.

Attack upon the veracity of many of the verses within context has begun, stating that Mark 16, verse 9 through the end of the chapter, are redactive, for example, is one of many destructive approaches taken by those who would do away with the doctrines of hell and Eternal Damnation.

"There is some good in all the translations" - So say the promoters of the perversions of scripture. Poison in a pot of soup in the kitchen, would not evoke praise in the dining room. So say I, Theo Book.

Texts themselves introduce a new element into the fray, as evidenced by the variations between the Byzantine (KJV) and the Alexandrian (RV -1881 & ASV-1901) text. The RSV - 1946 reflects the views of contemporary scholars, and is an eclectic text.

Look for instance, at the reconstruction of Acts 15:24.
Greek text of Stephens, 1550 - The common text in England. (KJV)

Epeidee eekousamen oti tines ez eemwn ezelthontes etarazan umas logois

anaskeuazontes tas psuxas umwn

lagontes peritemnesthai kai teerein ton nomon

ois ou diesteilametha.


Greek text of Nestle; 21st ed.; (NIV)

Epeidee eekousamen oti tines ez eemwn etarazan umas logois

anaskeuazontes tas psuxas umwn

ois ou diesteilametha.

The result of such perversion? Peter and the eleven now become preachers of circumcision, and keeping the law, because the "content" of the denial of the apostles and elders, with the whole church, is missing. This radically changes the fact that Peter himself denied that the gentiles were to keep circumcision and the law. Claim is now made that Peter and the eleven had the specific goal to Judaize the gentile converts.

This is the beginning of why we hold the KJV so dear. It has problems, but we begin to recognize them from familiarity, as we have dealt with them, and do not have to "relearn" the errors of translation.




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