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Jhud -> RE: Is Belief in God Logical? (7/22/2008 3:11:37 PM)
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quote:
It's clear to me that you are using everyday "ordinary" causality and applying it where you ought not, ie, to the hypothetical eternal. I agree that an "ordinary" ball-bearing can be shown to cause an "ordinary" indentation in an "ordinary" cushion. However, that is also to say, in "ordinary" parlance, that the indentation did not exist prior to the ball-bearing being introduced to the cushion. In other words, in "ordinary" parlance a cause by definition preceedes it's effect. This obviously is not the case with your hypothetical, eternally extant ball-bearing and associated indentation and so the the application of the "ordinary" is very clearly meaningless and no better than my counter hypothesis that "the indentation caused the ball-bearing." And yes, if anybody is wondering, I am aware of how funny this conversation is. It must be a wind up. Surely? Jacky Jack? Joky joke? Well, I am not sure how long two people can have a serious conversation about an eternal ball and pillow, but I do have a point, which you seem to be missing. Though all analogies are imperfect, when one considers a hypothetical for the sake of discussion, it doesn't do to question the inherent presumptions of the hypothetical for the very reason they are presumed to begin with. And unless the hypothetical requires one to accept that which is known to be impossible, pretty much anything is hypothetically game. For example, if I said, "Presume a man jumps off a building..." it would do no good for you to say, "...but what if he didn't jump? What if the building shifted from underneath him and he simply fell?" The reason it wouldn't do is because I am asking you to accept as a given that the man jumped, and absent a logical reason to the contrary, for the sake of the hypothetical one accepts the premise. The premise of my hypothetical is that two objects exist eternally. Existing eternally, one object affects another. Unless you can show how it is that an eternal object can't be eternally having an effect on another eternal object, it must be agreed that the cause of an effect need not be 'previous' to be considered a cause. I used a ball ad pillow because that is a readily comprehensible set of objects whereby the effect is proximate to the cause. That being the case, did you ever hear the one about the ball and pillow that walked into the bar?
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